The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates

Sobre el libro The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates de Peter T. Leeson publicado por Princeton en 2009:

This engaging account is fun to read and full of humor, qualities not often associated with an explanation of economic theory. The author describes the final decade of the great age of piracy, 1716-1726, when approximately two thousand pirates sailed the Caribbean, Atlantic, and Indian oceans. During this era, pirate society was ordered on the "one pirate, one vote" principle, which allowed the entire crew to elect the captain and the quartermaster, who was in charge of discipline. This was done so that pirates could concentrate on accruing wealth, and did not have to be concerned with abusive officers, who could be removed by vote. The "Custom of the Coast" code that governed pirate life included strict regulation of drinking and smoking, which could destroy a ship, scatter its accumulated wealth, and kill the crew.